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LET US PRAYAN AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION
CHARLES

T

E.

RICE*

CATHOLIC, AND ESPECIALLY the Catholic lawyer, ought to consider
the school prayer matter in several aspects. One aspect is the problem
of constitutionality. Another is the question of the practical benefit to be
derived from the institutionalization of governmentally-sponsored religious observances. And a third is the problem of whether the long-term
interest of the Church will be served by an amendment to overrule the
United States Supreme Court's decisions. It will be profitable here to discuss the problems of constitutionality and practical benefit before
proceeding to an inquiry as to whether the Catholic opponents of an
amendment are, perhaps through an overconcentration upon the problem
of federal aid to education, sowing the seeds of principles which, in their
long-term effect, will rebound to the serious disadvantage of the Church
in particular and religion in general.

HE

Constitutionality
The school prayer decisions were wrongly decided as a matter of constitutional law. Their basic fallacy lies in the Court's erroneous construction of the doctrine of neutrality which is implicit in the establishment
clause of the first amendment. That clause reads simply, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . . ." It was undeniably understood by its framers that establishment of religion "meant the
setting up or recognition of a state church, or at least the conferring upon
one church of special favors and advantages which are denied to others."'
The motive for the enactment of the clause was, in the words of James
Madison during a debate in the first Congress, that "the people feared
one sect might obtain a preeminence, or two combine together, and
establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform.' 2 The
goal, in a word, was to achieve governmental neutrality among religions.
The word "religion," however, for constitutional purposes, presupposed
Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
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that a belief in God was the common denominator of all religions. As the Supreme
Court stated in .1890, "the term 'religion'
has reference to one's views of his relations
to his Creator, and to the obligations they
impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will. ' ' 3 The establishment clause, therefore, was more precisely designed to ensure governmental neutrality among religious sects professing a
belief in God. It was never meant to compel
neutrality on the part of government as between those religions that profess a belief in
God and those that do not, i.e., between
theistic and non-theistic religions. In the
words of Mr. Justice Story, who served on
the Supreme Court from 1811 to .1845, and
who was himself a leading Unitarian:
Probably at the time of the adoption of the
constitution, and of the first amendment to
it ...the general if not the universal sentirnent in America was, that Christianity
ought to receive encouragement from the
state so far as was not incompatible with
the private rights of conscience and the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to
level all religions, and to make it a matter
of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation.
The real object of the amendment was not
to countenance, much less to advance,
Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity,
by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude
all rivalry among Christian sects, and to
prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the
exclusive patronage of the national governlent.

4

it was in the light of this understanding that
the Supreme Court properly affirmed, in

1892, that "this is a Christian nation." 5
This background, of course, must be considered in conjunction with its complement
in the first amendment, the free exercise
clause. Together, the two clauses read:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. . . ." The free exercise
clause has always protected the believer and
non-believer alike against any coercion to
believe in, or disbelieve, any religion. But
the establishment clause, at the same time,
sanctioned a governmental hospitality toward, and impartial encouragement of,
theistic religions.
All this, however, has now been changed.
In the 1961 case of Torcaso v. Watkins,"
the Supreme Court invalidated a provision
of the constitution of Maryland requiring a
state employee to declare his belief in God.
The test, said Mr. Justice Black speaking
for the Court, unconstitutionally invaded
the employee's "freedom of belief and religion ....,,7
The requirement was invalid because "the power and authority of the State
of Maryland thus is put on the side of one
particular sort of believers-those who are
willing to say they believe in 'the existence
of God.' "s The Court then emphasized the
right of non-theistic beliefs to protection as
religions:
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a
State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion.' Neither
can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against
non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S.

Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
STORY, COMMENTARIES

ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF ]HE UNITED STATES §§ 1874, 1877 (1891).

457, 471 (1892).
6 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
7Id. at 496.
l at 490.
1d.

10
God as against those religions founded on

different beliefs." (Emphasis added.)
Appended to the last quoted clause was a
footnote specifying that:
Among religions in this country which do
not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are
Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular.
Humanism and others.' 0
In view of this holding, it may now be
said that there are two general types of religions entitled to the protections of the first
amendment. On the one hand are those
which profess a belief in God. For purposes
of discussion, let us call them theistic, and
for analysis we shall include therein both
deistic and theistic beliefs in God with their
variant interpretations of the nature of God
and his providence. On the other hand are
those non-theistic religions described in Mr.
Justice Black's footnote in the Torcaso case.
Of the four he mentioned, the two most important in contemporary terms are Ethical
Culture and Secular Humanism, both of
which may be called non-theistic religions
in that they do not affirm the existence of
God. It is reasonable also to include atheism
and agnosticism, whether organized or unorganized, within the broad Torcaso description of non-theistic religions, since
both are compatible with Ethical Culture
and Secular Humanism.
It was difficult to tell whether the Court
in Torcaso rested its decision upon the establishment clause or the free exercise
clause, although it is more likely that it was
the latter. In either event, today the Supreme Court has removed all doubt that the
broad definition of religion applies to the
establishment clause. The Court in the 1963
9 Id. at 495.
hi. at 495 ni.l.
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school prayer decision, which was based on
the establishment clause, quoted approvingly the principle laid down in the Torcaso
case, that neither a state nor the federal
government "can constitutionally pass laws
or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither
can aid those religions based on a belief in
the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs."' 1 The
Court has now ordained, therefore, through
its misconstruction of the establishment
clause, that the government is required to
be neutral as between the two great classes
of religions, the theistic and the non-theistic.
When this erroneously imposed neutrality is coupled with the Court's tendency to
view the first amendment in rigorously absolute terms, one is drawn to the conclusion
that the new interpretation would plainly interdict a governmental affirmation that there
is, indeed, as the Declaration of Independence affirms, a "Creator," a "Supreme
Judge of the World." Thus it is that Mr. Justice Brennan, in his extensive concurring
opinion in the 1963 prayer case, in which
opinion he probed the consequences of the
Court's ruling, could bring himself to observe that the words "under God" in the
pledge of allegiance are not necessarily unconstitutional only because they "may
merely recognize the historical fact that our
Nation was believed to have been founded
'under God' "12 (emphasis added). Presumably, if the words were construed as a
present affirmation of truth, rather than a
rote commemoration of an historical fact
(or curiosity), they would be unconstitutional.

I1School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 220 (1963), quoting Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
1L Id. at 304.
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Actions or proceedings have been instituted to remove those words from the
pledge, to invalidate governmentally-paid
chaplaincies in the military services and.
prisons, to strike down the tax privileges
enjoyed by religious organizations, and to
eliminate other remaining public evidences
that this is a nation which subordinates itself to God. The free-exercise-clause rights
of prisoners and military personnel could
well be violated unless the government, as
the Schempp Court noted, "permits voluntary religious services to be conducted with
the use of government facilities....13
(Emphasis added.) It may not be rash to
note that the Court's reference only to "government facilities" leaves clouded the constitutional future of chaplains themselves on
the government payroll. Similarly, the religious tax privileges in question apply to the
purely religious activities of churches as well
as to those activities, such as teaching mathematics in parochial schools, which serve a
valid secular purpose. The tax privileges
are, it is fair to say, in serious jeopardy of
at least partial invalidation.
Given the proclivity of the current members of the Supreme Court to adhere tenaciously to their own abstractions (which in
religion cases have generally been born in
gratuitous and self-generated obiter dicta
in the Court's own opinions), and given the
sweeping character of those reigning abstractions, we may fairly expect the manifestations of our religious heritage in public
life to be eliminated, singly but inexorably,
by judicial decree. Only a constitutional
amendment can be counted upon to check
the trend, for the notion of judicial self-restraint seems to have fallen out of favor
among the majority of the Court.
13

Id. at 226 n.10.

The objection is sometimes made that, if
prayer is permitted in schools or other public
activities, the practices will inevitably deteriorate into a rampant sectarianism in
which, for example, a communal rosary in
public school would become the order of
the day in a district where Roman Catholics
predominate. There are ample safeguards
against such excess. For one thing, the common sense and good faith of the people involved at the local level can usually be
counted upon to prevent the observances
from being carried to a sectarian extreme.
If, however, the problem actually does arise,
and, judging from experience, it will arise
infrequently if at all, the state and federal
courts should deal with it on a case-by-case
basis. But in so doing, the courts ought to
afford a greater latitude to the local governments to solve the problem than they are
now given. At what point are the courts
to intervene? In terms of the establishment
clause, such things as the communal rosary
ought to be prohibited as overly sectarian.
The Lord's Prayer and Scripture reading,
however, ought to be allowed, in view of
our history and tradition. Also, if the case
should ever occur, a mere devotional reading from the Koran, in a public school in
which Moslems predominate, should be allowed, in deference to the federal character
of our government. and the general practical
wisdom of local control. Operating under
the free exercise clause, the courts should
invalidate a local practice only when there
is actual coercion upon children to participate. In this context, mere embarrassment
ought not to be considered such coercion, so
long as scrupulous efforts are made by the
authorities to minimize such embarrassment.
In fact, a proper deference by the
Supreme Court to the concept of federalism

10 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER

and a healthy respect by the Court for the
fairness and capacity of local governments
would serve to restore a proper balance in
this area. The Supreme Court of the United
States is ill-equipped to rule in a matter such
as this by uniform, centralized decree. It is
not, as has often been said, a "Supreme
School Board." Nor should it be.
Some opponents of an amendment maintain that the inclusion of prayers in a public
school necessarily violates the free exercise
of religion by children and their parents,
who do not believe in God. There are four
weaknesses in that argument. First, in none
of the cases in question was any child actually coerced to do or say anything, and the
right of non-participation was scrupulously
preserved. Second, the Supreme Court did
not decide the cases on the free exercise
basis, but rather under the establishment
clause, and it is upon the Court's interpretation of the latter clause that approval or
disapproval of the rulings ought to be based.
Third, even if we do consider the free exercise question, the dictates of common sense
are persuasive. Dean Erwin N. Griswold of
Harvard Law School said it this way in a
passage that is worth quoting at length:
Let us consider the Jewish child, or the
Catholic child, or the nonbeliever, or the
Congregationist, or the Quaker. He, either
alone, or with a few or many others of his
views, attends a public school, whose School
District, by local action, has prescribed the
Regents' prayer. When the prayer is recited,
if this child or his parents feel that he cannot participate, he may stand or sit, in respectful attention, while the other children
take part in the ceremony. Or he may leave
the room. It is said that this is bad, because
it sets him apart from other children. It is
even said that there is an element of compulsion in this-what the Supreme Court
has called an 'indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform.' But
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is this the way it should be looked at? The
child of a nonconforming or minority group
is, to be sure, different in his beliefs. That is
what it means to be a member of a minority.
Is it not desirable, and educational, for him
to learn and observe this, in the atmosphere
of the school-not so much that he is different, as that other children are different from
him? And is it not desirable that, at the
same time, he experiences and learns the
fact that his difference is tolerated and accepted? No compulsion is put upon him.
He need not participate. But he, too, has
the opportunity to be tolerant. He allows
the majority of the group to follow their
own tradition, perhaps coming to understand and to respect what they feel is significant to them.
Is this not a useful and valuable and educational and, indeed, a spiritual experience for
the children of what I have called the majority group? They experience the values of
their own culture; but they also see that
there are others who do not accept those
values, and that they are wholly tolerated
in their nonacceptance. Learning tolerance
for other persons, no matter how different,
and respect for their beliefs, may be an
important part of American education, and
wholly consistent with the First Amendment. I hazard the thought that no one
would think otherwise were it not for parents who take an absolutist approach to
the problem, perhaps encouraged by the
absolutist expressions of Justices of the
Supreme Court, on and off the bench.1 4
The fourth fallacy in the free exercise objection to an amendment is that the objection overlooks the right of the majority of
citizens to the free exercise of their religion.
Strict neutrality between theism and nontheism, as broadly defined by the Supreme
Court, is not attainable. When public offi14 Griswold, Absolute Is In The Dark- A Discussion Of The Approach Of The Supreme Court
To ConstitutionalQuestions, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167,
177 (1963).
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cials, including school teachers, are compelled to suspend judgment in the course
of their official activities on the question of
whether there is a God, the effect is an official adoption to that extent of the agnostic
approach. Parents and children who believe
in God may properly ask why those children
must attend a public school where, over
their objection, the basic question of God's
existence is treated in an agnostic way
which is incompatible with, and offensive
to, their beliefs and the basic theistic tenets
upon which the Republic was nurtured.
In short, there can be no governmental
neutrality between theistic and non-theistic
religions in terms of the establishment
clause. The perpetual suspension of judgment enjoined by the Court on the part of
government as to whether there is a God
is in reality a mere replacement of the traditional and proper theistic affirmation by
a new, non-theistic orthodoxy of agnosticism-a public agnosticism which will, if
embedded in our law, spawn a public policy
of affirmative and militant secularism.
Practical Benefit
A brief comment is in order on the practical benefit to be derived from a favorable
resolution of the amendment question. The
issue is, essentially, "can government constitutionally recognize that there is a God?"
Implicit in such recognition is an affirmation
that there is a standard of right and wrong
higher than the state itself. The child who
routinely sees the agents of the government,
be they teachers or presidents, affirm the
existence and supremacy of God and His
law over all is less likely to follow the demagogue who asserts for the state, and for himself as its oracle, the final power to ordain
what is right and wrong in a matter of public
or private morality. Moreover, an inculca-

tion of mere ethical values without reference
to their divine source cannot serve this purpose as well as an assertion of the supremacy of an unchanging lawgiver. For, if ethical
precepts arise from some non-divine source
such as the Constitution, a consensus or a
social contract, then they can be subject to,
change or disregard by a totalitarian state
or by a modem democracy enjoying the
assent of a majority of its citizens. If we are
to preserve the limited government that is
the hallmark of American constitutionalism,
we can hardly disregard the lesson of history
that a strong assurance against governmental abuse is a citizenry devoted to ultimate
values transcending the changing will of the
state. It is surprising, and disappointing that
some Catholic opponents of a prayer
amendment have not addressed themselves
to this question of the necessity of a frank
acknowledgement by the state of the existence of a divine standard higher than itself.
On Thomas Jefferson's Memorial there is
inscribed his questioning warning: "God
Who gave us life gave us liberty. Can the
liberties of a nation be secure when we have
removed a conviction that these liberties are
the gift of God?"
In recent decades the schools of America
have retreated from the unapologetic inculcation of love for God and country. Perhaps
coincidentally, the educational philosophy
of permissiveness gained supremacy during
the same period. Today we are confronted
with juvenile disciplinary problems of unprecedented magnitude. It is fair to say that
the restoration and advancement of character will be furthered by teaching our children that there is indeed a "law of Nature
and of Nature's God," which enjoins upon
them a rejection of vagrant self-indulgence
in favor of an ordered pursuit of a higher
good.

10
Aid To Parochial Schools
Until 1962 the center stage in the continuing debate on church-state relations was
held by the controversy over federal aid to
church-related schools. Today, however,
the main issue is public prayer. There are
some proponents of federal aid to churchrelated schools who consider that issue of
such transcendent importance that it appears to have influenced considerably their
attitude toward the different question of the
constitutionality of public prayer. Such an
,effect is understandable, for the constitutional justification of federal aid to parochial
schools is rather plain, and the equities of
fair treatment are compelling.15 Nevertheless, a word of caution is in order to those
whose preoccupation with the aid question
may lead them to an erroneous and potentially dangerous oppostion to a public
prayer amendment.
Those who favor fair federal aid ought
to consider favorably a prayer amendment.
This is so because the outcome of the
amendment controversy is likely to determine whether the federal government
shall assume a posture of hospitality toward
theistic religion or a falsely neutral pose
which is likely to lead to antagonism toward
:5

1

hasten to add, incidentally, that I offer this

judgment, not as an advocate of federal aid, but
rather as one who agrees that such federal aid
would be constitutional and fair, but who also is
convinced that there ought to be no general program of federal aid to education, whether public
or private, since the state and local communities
are adequately meeting their public educational
needs. Moreover, a general federal subsidy of

local school would entail an undue risk of burdensome federal administrative controls over private
as well as public schools. I believe that there
should not be general federal aid to education,

but if there is to be such, it should be non-discriminatory as between public and private (including parochial) schools.
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theistic religion. Equality of treatment for
parochial school children in any general
program of federal aid can be attained only
as an incidental effect of a general climate
of governmental hospitality toward theism.
Those who believe that equality of federal
aid can be achieved in the teeth of a prevailing official policy which, through a degeneration of the false neutrality of agnosticism,
regards theistic religion with hostility, are
unrealistic. Nor can it be expected that
those vocal groups which oppose both federal aid to parochial schools and the prayer
amendment will moderate their opposition
to the former merely because some Catholic
spokesmen have joined them in opposition
to the latter.
But there is a more fundamental consideration involved. The condition of the public schools and the caliber of its graduates
are matters of concern to all of us, whether
Catholics or not. There is abroad in some
quarters the idea that the acknowledgment
of God in public schools is not something
about which Catholics ought to get very
excited, since the primary educational concern of Catholics is the preservation and
expansion of the parochial school system.
The School PrayerDecisions seem to have
influenced some Catholics to increase their
efforts to secure federal aid for the support
and expansion of parochial schools where
children, unlike their public school contemporaries, can enjoy a school climate in
which a frank acknowledgment of God can
still be made. Such an attitude, which would
employ the increasing secularization of the
public school system as an argument in
favor of a public subsidy for the churchrelated school system, is parochial at best
and selfish at worst. Ironically, if the Court
should continue its tendency to apply to
(Continued on page 193)

